和讯网推出《华尔街风云》专栏，邀请极具洞察力的中外专家学者及资深媒体人士加盟，从各个角度观察这场正在肆虐的华尔街风暴。他们将从纷繁的信息中为您提供有价值的观点，在夸张的事实面前为您讲述动人的体悟。
作者简介：
查尔斯•吉斯特（Charles Geisst）是《华尔街史》（Wall Street: A History ,Oxford University Press, 1997)、《华尔街投资银行史：华尔街金融王朝的秘密》（The Last Partnerships: Inside the Great Wall Street Money Dynasties , McGraw Hill, 2001)、《美国垄断史——帝国的缔造者和他们的敌人(从杰伊•古尔德到比尔•盖茨)》（Monopolies in America: Empire Builders and Their Enemies from Jay Gould to Bill Gates, Oxford University Press, 2000)等17部著作的作者。他也是《美国商业史大百科全书》（Facts On File，2005）的编辑和主要撰稿人。
查尔斯•吉斯特1946年生于新泽西，1968年和1970年在里士满大学获得学士与硕士学位，1972年在伦敦经济政治学院获得博士学位，并以访问学者身份在耶鲁大学法学院和牛津大学金融学系从事博士后研究。
1972年至1975年间，他在纽约城市大学短暂任教，随后在伦敦金融城的数家投资银行担任资本市场分析师和投资银行家。自1985年以后，他在纽约曼哈顿大学担任金融学教授至今，同时为多家金融机构提供咨询服务。
正文(本文系和讯网《华尔街风云》专栏特约文章) ：
在1972年的美国电影《候选人》里，影星罗伯特•雷德福主演了一位年轻的候选人。这位候选人经历了一场格外肮脏的选战，最终在参议院里赢得一席之地。当被通知自己选举获胜的时候，候选人问了一个很天真的问题：“我们现在该怎么办？”
近日来，同样的问题在金融市场里被频频提起。每一天似乎都有新的答案，每一天市场依然不为之所动。在两房（房地美、房利美）和美国国际集团(AIG)被国有化、雷曼兄弟倒闭之后，几乎没有人对随后的信贷市场彻底瘫痪以及股票市场的剧烈波动有所准备。国会因7000亿干涉方案所起的肮脏争执没有起到帮助作用。同样，美联储宣布开始购买商业票据之举也未见成效。看上去，美国当权者对于危机处理已经黔驴技穷。
六个月以前，美国对于经济衰退是否迫近尚无统一意见。今天，人们开始讨论另一场经济萧条的可能，似乎它难以避免。人们摇摆的情绪在股市中表现得一览无余，一天之内的股指波动往往可抗衡1929年的全年表现。对冲基金在全球范围内不受限制地流动资金，冰岛作为一个小国深受其苦，已濒于崩溃边缘。各国央行真正做到了步调一致，联手降息之举是1987年以美元为名进行戏剧化干涉后的第一次。
联合行动可以引领未来的应对方向。尽管信贷市场无视了此番行动，它们终将意识到联合行动对每一个参与者都有益。多年以来，特别是苏联垮台之后，“全球化”一词被随意征用，世界正在迈向一个共同的大市场，进入这个市场的方式在之前难以想象。如果说全球化对于制造业和服务业还是一个梦想，在金融业里它已经接近于真理。过去15年里，金融世界里疆界萎缩，或好或坏，难以定夺。
对冲基金现在可以在各个金融中心之间轻松转移资金。用一国货币借来的钱很容易被使用杠杆投到另一个市场里，交易费用也在多种情形之下比过去有所降低。甚至，个人投资者也被卷入这场交易。冰岛和罗马尼亚的购房者可以借入日元来购置房产，这与对冲基金的行为没有实质区别，只是后者的交易规模大了许多。日元的利率不仅对日本和同业拆借市场具有重要意义，也对前所未有的更广泛的投资主体产生影响。在金融壁垒的消逝的背景下，任何忽略国际预警讯号的行为将严重伤害金融健康。
所有这些讯号正在指向一个越来越悲观的世界经济前景。不幸的是，公司与银行资产负债表上的杠杆使用量同样体现在美国的家庭账单上。如果股市的跌幅和日间波动是一种指示的话，衰退将不是主要的担忧所在——萧条才是。这一观点在一个月前还没有如此令人生畏。信贷市场和银行由此坚定不移地拒绝给彼此或他人提供贷款。这对于根基就建在信用与杠杆之上的社会来说是灾难性的。即便当下的问题明天就会消失，消费者和公司也要花费数年来改掉他们之前养成的敞手借钱的习惯。
过去两周股票市场的波动说明，市场最终要寻求更高权威机构的指引。这是投降的标志，因为市场一直在为引领发达社会的经济指标沾沾自喜，一直鄙视政府干涉它们挣钱的方式。而现在，连G-7可能干预的暗示都能讨市场的欢心，因为其对于未来的方向感已经丧失殆尽。
等到眼下这场危机有了更清晰的关注点的时候，既有的金融业市场实践和态度显然需要改变。在过去30年间，政府的监管者在华尔街面前扮演了兼职交通警察的角色，满足于只在华尔街需要的时候给它指个方向。2004年，证券交易委员会（SEC）屈从于顶级投资银行们的请求，降低了对它们的资本金要求，使其可以将自由资本投入到充满风险的抵押证券市场当中。其后果是灾难性的，对所有涉足其中的人都如此，SEC作为街角警察的形象也沾上了永久性的污点。
当下的问题不仅仅需要密集的政策讨论。一些艰难的选择在所难免。如果G-7同意以直接购买股权的方式往银行注入资金，他们需要防止热钱流动抵消掉他们的良好意愿。同意让英国国有化其银行、却让美国另辟蹊径是没有道理可谈的。基金往英国流动可能造成另一个类似于冰岛的困境。对冲基金可能会抱怨这侵犯了它们自由投资的权利，但是如果它们的行为在紧急情况下足以抵消政策决定的话，它们转移资金的权利应该受到临时资本控制举措的限制。
虽然全球化带来了良好收益，两年前对冲基金轻易进入多国金融市场就已埋下了不可预知的隐患。借用数十亿资金进行的短期投资给金融体系带来出离想像的波折。当英国数以千计的储户因为把钱存在冰岛在英国的分行里而面临损失时、当冰岛政府已经对于偿还储户无计可施时，我们该问一句到底是什么致使我们走入如此不堪的境地。如果疆界在对冲基金面前需要保护，现在到了竖起壁垒的时候了。
股票市场将不喜欢这一想法，因为它们很大一部分的身家性命都倚仗于这些对冲基金的主要经纪业务。除非监管者和财政部长们认识到眼下的情况在战略上与在金融上同样重要，限制对冲基金流动的建议很难良好实施。悲哀的是，不完整的解决方案尚未触动市场，越完整，可能对市场触动得越小。（翻译：黄洁）
附原文：
An Unhedged Bet
There is a movie made in the US in 1972 called The Candidate, starring Robert Redford. In it, a young candidate finally wins a US Senate seat after a particularly nasty campaign battle. When he is informed he won, the candidate naively asks, “What do we do now?”
The same question is being asked in the financial markets these days. Every day it seems there is a new answer and every day the markets seem to shrug it off. After the nationalization of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, AIG, and the collapse of Lehman Brothers, almost no one was prepared for the total paralysis of the credit markets and the volatility in the stock markets that followed. The nasty battle in Congress over the $700 billion intervention plan did not help nor did the Federal Reserve's announcement that it would begin buying commercial paper. It seemed that US authorities were running out of possible solutions to the problem.
Six months ago there was no consensus in the U.S. that a recession was imminent. Today, another depression is being discussed as if it were inevitable. The swing in mood is best evident in the stock market where daily swings in the indices rival the total index measure in 1929. As hedge funds move funds around the globe with impunity a small country, Iceland, is on the verge of financial collapse partially because of their actions. The central banks have actually acted in a concerted fashion to lower interest rates for the first time since their dramatic intervention on behalf of the dollar in 1987.
This last phenomenon may give some indication of how to act in the future. While the credit markets ignored the central banks' actions on the day they were announced, they may yet come to realize that this concerted effort is in everyone's best interest. For years, especially since the fall of the Soviet Union, the term “globalization” has been bandied about. The world's markets are now joined in ways unimaginable before and the world is moving closer to one large market. While this is still nothing more than a dream for many manufacturers and service providers, it is much closer to the truth in finance. The world has shrunk considerably in the last 15 years, for better or worse.
Hedge funds are now able to move money between financial centers with ease. Money borrowed in one national currency can easily be employed using leverage in another market, in many cases with less transaction costs than in the past. Even individuals have gotten in on the deal. Home buyers in Iceland or Romania have been able to borrow yen in order to finance their purchases while hedge funds do much the same carry trade on a much larger scale. Yen interest rates have become important not only to Japan or the LIBOR market but to a much wider array of investors than ever before. The financial world has shrunk in size to a point where ignoring international warning signs of calamity can be seriously injurious to financial health.
All of these signs are pointing to an increasingly negative outlook for the world economy. Unfortunately, the amount of leverage on corporate and bank balance sheets has been accompanied by similar leverage in household balance sheets in the United States. If the size of the stock market drops and the intra-day volatility are any indication, a recession is not the main worry – a depression is. This idea is less repugnant than it was only a month ago. The credit market and the banks steadfastly refuse to loan funds to each other or to anyone else for that matter. For societies built on credit and leverage, this is disastrous. Even if the whole problem disappeared tomorrow, it would take years to wean consumers and companies away from their profligate borrowing habits of the past.
Stock market volatility over the past two weeks suggests that the markets are finally looking for guidance from a higher authority. This is a sign of capitulation because markets have always been boastful that they are the leading economic indicator in advanced societies, disdainful of government interference in the way they make money. But now even the hint of G-7 intervention of any sort gives the markets heart because the idea of future direction has been lost totally.
When the current crisis comes into clearer focus, it is evident that old market practices and attitudes toward ding business will have to change. For the last 30 years, government regulators have acted as part-time traffic policemen content to direct Wall Street only when it actually suited the Street. In 2004, the Securities and Exchange Commission succumbed to a request from the top investment banks to loosen their capital requirements so that they could deploy the freed capital into the risky mortgage securitization business. The results were disastrous for all concerned, including the SEC which has seen its image as a cop on the corner tarnished permanently.
The current problem at hand will need more than simply a concentrated policy discussion. Some difficult choices are inevitable. If the G-7 agrees to recapitalize banks with direct equity infusions, they will also need to prevent the movement of hot money from offsetting their good intentions. There would be little point in allowing Britain to nationalize its banks while allowing the US to travel down a different path. The flow of funds into Britain as a result could create another Icelandic type problem. The hedge funds may complain that this infringes on their right to invest where they choose but if they are able to offset policy decisions made in times of emergency then their right to transfer money should be restrained by temporary capital controls.
Despite the benefits of globalization, the ease of access to many national financial markets by hedge funds has created problems unforeseen two years ago. Investing for the short-term using billions of borrowed money creates disturbances in financial systems never anticipated. When thousands of depositors in Britain are on the verge on losing their money in the UK branches of Icelandic banks and the Icelandic government is not quite sure how to reimburse them, it is time to ask how we got to this ludicrous position. If the borders need protection from the hedge funds, it is time to erect them.
The stock markets will not like this because they depend for so much of their livelihood on prime brokerage from the funds. Until regulators and finance ministers realize that the current problem is as much a strategic one as a financial one, the current proposed solutions will not work well. Unfortunately, incomplete solutions have not impressed the stock markets. The more complete solution will impress them even less.
